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International Law, National Tribunals and
the Rights of Aliens: The Latin American
Experience
Frank Griffith Dawson*
I. INTRODUCTION

The treatment nations accord aliens within their borders is largely
determined by historical precedent.' The Latin American experience
with aliens, differing radically from European and African experiences,
has fostered development of a unique body of law, clustered around
the Calvo Doctrine and the principle of national or equal treatment,
which clashes directly with the presumptions
underlying the so-called
2
international standard of justice.
*Member of the New York Bar, Secretary and Treasurer of the Procedural Aspects
of International Law Institute, Inc.
1. See Head, A Fresh Look at the Local Remedies Rule, 1967 CAN. YD. IN'L L.
142, 145 et. seq. for a brief, but extremely articulate, general summary of the treatment of aliens in Europe. The laws of Venezuela, Colombia and the Caribbean nations,
as they apply to the scope of this article, will be more fully explored in a forthcoming
study.
2. No essay on Latin American law can avoid considering the legal norms under
discussion in their proper context-that is, against the geographical, historical and
cultural millieu within which they are expected to function. The advisability of such
an approach to comparative legal studies is recognized in J. W. Wagner's study of
Cornell University's Project on General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized
Nations, International Team Work on the Common Care of Legal Systems, 8 Ass'N
AM. L. SchooL's FOREIGN EXCHANGE BULL. 3 (1966). See also Stone, The End to be
Served by Comparative Law, 25 TuL. L. REv. 325, 332 (1951). Unfortunately, limitations of space do not permit complete exposition of the more salient factors which
shape the Latin American legal environment. I would, however, suggest the following
observations as relevant: (a) "Latin America" does not exist as an entity. We are
dealing with twenty different countries which, despite certain similarities, differ greatly
from each other due to a variety of geographical, cultural, racial and political factors
which may also divide them internally into non-national states; (b) both colonial
and post-independence experiences have left a residue of disrespect for, and distrust
of, centralized government and the law in general, which, paradoxically, co-exists with
a tendency to relegate to government the most important role in the ordering of society; (c) the law in general has never been considered an instrument of social change,
as a source of individual rights, or as embodying constitutional limitations on the
actions of the sovereign; and (d) politically, the years since independence have been
characterized by a futile search for a symbol of legitimate authority to replace the
Crown. A partial list of sources which amplify the above might include T. FmLoL,
SocrAL FAcTORS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE ARGENTINE CASE 5-39 (1961);
P. JA Es, LATIN A-EmRCA 3-51 (3rd ed. 1959); T. McGANN, ARGENTINA: THE DIVIDED
LAND 9-38 (1966); J. PARRY, THE SPANISH SEABORNE EMPmE 361-81 (1966); F. TANNENBiAUM, TEN KEYS To LATIN AMERICA 3-172 (1962); H. DE VRIES & J. RODRIGUEZ-
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During the colonial period non-Iberian aliens were generally excluded by law from the Spanish and Portuguese possessions in the

New World.3 Therefore they either conducted clandestine trading

and smuggling activities or actively raided Spanish shipping and Latin
American port cities.4 After independence, however, non-Iberian
aliens began arriving in Latin America in increasing numbers, to be
confronted with sovereign nations and independent cultures by then
too well-established to be directly subdued or subverted.
Nonetheless, unlike the general European experience, the alien often
came from a nation much more powerful and more stable than his
host state, facts which, while in themselves insufficient to enable him
to undermine totally local laws to which he had technically sub5

mitted himself, led ultimately to demands for special treatment.

Latin America is today undergoing a profound technological revolution for which the United States is largely responsible, and which is
transforming the continent in a manner and at a pace never envisioned
by nineteenth century alien entrepreneurs. 6 Communication and trans-

portation media developed within the last fifty years have created
new demands for, and dependencies upon, the commercial products

and luxuries of the mechanized world7 and have precipitated demands
NovAs, THE LAw OF THE AmERCAS 161-73 (1965);

see also JosE MATA-GAVIOLA,
ANOTACIONES DE HISTORIA PATRIA CENTROAMERICANA (1953); SALOME CIL (Jose
Milla) HISTORLA DE AMERuCA CErrAL (1937); and Dawson, Labor Legislation and

Social Integration in Guatemala: 1871-1944, 14 AM. J. Cow,. L. 124 (1965).
3. Attempts at overt conquest by non-Iberian nations persisted even after the
Spanish colonies attained their independence, as in the United States-Mexican War of
1846-48; the William Walker expeditions in the 1850's to Nicaragua; the French,
English and Spanish intervention in Mexico of 1862-67; the Spanish attempt to recapture Peru in the 1860's, the Spanish-American War of 1898; and the various United
States' interventions in Panama, Central America, and the Caribbean in the early
(1963); F. FREDEL,
Twentieth Century. A CARR, THE WORLD AND WmLL M WALm
THE SPLENDID LITTLE WAR (1958); H. HARWo, A HIsToRY OF LATiN AMERICA
320-25, 445-46, 514-15, 757-67 (1956); J. Rippy, LATnm AMERJCA 176-78, 223-24,
363-64, 370, 516 (1958); E. WALLACE, DESTWnY AND GLORY (1957).
4. J.PARRY, supra note 2, at 251-71; H. HAuNG, supra note 3, at 193-207.
5. The stage was thus set in the nineteenth century for the 1938 confrontation between U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the Mexican Government over the
nationalization of the Mexican oil industry. Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate
and Effective": A Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORD. L. REv. 727, 733-34
(1962); See Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations, 17 N.Y.U. L. Q. 327 (1940); CLnE,
THE UNrrED STATES AND MEXIco, cbs. 11-12 (1961).

6. In Latin America "The great change of our time is the consumer's revolution
propelled by the United States." F. TANNENBAUM, supra note 2, at 202. "A mass
market requires an egalitarian society based upon the mass." Id. at 204. This revolution, more than the urgings of political agitators, is altering forever the old Latin
America and undermining the stratified society which has characterized it since the
conquest (and thereby undercutting those aristocratic elements with which United
States policy makers have been traditionally associated).
7. As a result, "The poor in Latin America are poorer today also because they
want more than their forefathers did. Not only are there more of them, but they
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for radical change in out-moded economic and political patterns.,
This has inspired programs for economic integration on the international level, and, within individual nations, for industrialization and
product diversification to limit dependence upon primary commodity
exports.9 Foreign investment is openly encouraged'0 by recipient
states, while capital-exporting nations and international lending institutions actively seek investment opportunities for reasons of private
gain and foreign~policy.
As a result, the tempo and number of transactions involving transfers of wealth and skills to, from, and within Latin America has been
vastly accelerated, thereby increasing sharply the number, content,
and possible legal interrelationships between aliens and foreign
have learned to expect more of life. They want more of the gadgets we advertise.
Most of them have seen our movies, heard the radio or seen pictures in newspapers
and magazines (which they could not read). New roads, such as the very excellent
ones in Peru, have opened the way to the great city, and large numbers of people
have arrived in crowded buses or on foot. They have seen the wonders of the modern
world and they want to participate in it." Id. at 205-06.
8. The situation is, of course, greatly complicated by chronic political instability,
appalling economic and educational disparities between the upper and lower classes, a
soaring birth rate which will require Latin America to double its present food production by 1980 in order to feed its projected population of 360,000,000, the ideological
confrontation between East and West, the Moscow-Peking rivalry, and the influence
and intervention of Fidel Castro's Cuba. See generally ALEXANDER, TODAY'S LATIN
AMERIcA (1962); BENTON, THE VOICE or LATIN AMERICA (1961); A. BEILE, LATIN
A ERIcA-DIPLOMACY AND REALrry (1962); HiRSCmAN, JOURNEYS TowARD P1ocArss
(1963); JoNsoN, POLITICAL CHANCE IN LATIN AMEmiCA: THE EMERGENCE OF THE
MIDDLE SECToRS (1958); LATIN AMERICA IssUEs, ESSAYS AND COMETS (Hirsehman
ed. 1961); P. NENm vms, LATIN AMERICA: MYTH AND REALITY (1964); SOCIAL
CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA TODAY (Council on Foreign Relations ed. 1960) SZULC,
TWILIGrr OF THE TYRANTS (1959); THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMEMCA (The
American Assembly ed. 1959).
9. The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) (Argentina, Chile, Brazil,
Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay) and the Central
American Common Market (CACM) have been functioning since 1960, and merger
is now a distinct possibility. LATIN AmmuCAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: EXPERIENCES
AND PROSPECTS (M. Wionczek ed. 1966); LA INTEGRACION ECONOMICA LATINO
AMmcANA (Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior S.A. de Mexico ed. 1963).
10. Such legislation often offers tax holidays, customs exemptions, and other privileges which will give a new business enterprise a comparative competitive advantage.
For example, in Guatemala the Ley de Fomento Industrial accords new industries
a ten-year exemption from customs duties on imports of necessary machinery, as well
as a five-year exemption from any tax on profits. 78 RECOPILACION DE LAS LEYES DE LA
REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA 50, 51 (1959-60). Similar privileges are offered by Costa
Rica's Ley de Desarrollo y Proteccion Industrial. See Ley No. 2426 (Sept. 3, 1959)
and its implementing legislation. See also Nattier, Latin American Incentives and Restraints, in I DOING BusiNEss ABROAD 12-17 (New York P.L.I. ed. 1962). Sometimes
foreign firms feel compelled to establish themselves in a market to which they had
formerly been exporting in order to meet competition provided by newly-established
domestic industries. Angulo, A Proposed Decalogue for Conducting Manufacturing
Operations in Latin America (unpublished manuscript in possession of the author).
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nations, as well as opportunities for disagreement and dispute." The
influence of the non-Latin American alien and his culture upon the
lands south of the Rio Grande River has never been so great. Hence,
a review of the treatment accorded aliens in Latin American courts,
and of the legal environment in which the courts function, may be
both timely and informative. 2
This essay will examine the various constitutional and legislative
guarantees of access to judicial relief, seek to weigh the impact on
access of the Calvo and the National Treatment Doctrines, and then

illustrate, by reference to specific problems in the administration of
justice and the enforcement of civil rights, some potential procedural

problem areas which may remain after access has been obtained.
IL CONSTriUTiONAL A

LEGISLATnwE GuARA

s OF AccEss

TO, AND FAIR TBEATmENT IN, CoURTs AND

ADm IusTATrIvE T

BUNALs

The procedural legislation of Latin American nations' 3 does not
discriminate unreasonably against aliens, but accords them equal
access to their courts with nationals.' 4 For example, article 20 of the
11. For a consideration of the implications of this general problem on a global
scale, see Dawson, International Law and the Procedural Rights of Aliens Before
National Tribunals, 17 INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 404 (1968).
12. Such an examination may now be particularly relevant since the new nationalism
now sweeping Latin America "insists upon the recognition of the importance of
Latin America in world affairs and is sometimes expressed in hositility to foreign
entrepreneurs and vigorous dislike of interference from outside." D. PEaucNs, THE
umcA 74 (1961). See also Thomas, Latin American
UN=TED STATEs AND LAN A
Nationalism and the United States, 7 J. OF L. Am. STumEs 5 (1965).
13. Space does not permit a country-by-country review of applicable laws, so a
process of selection, seeking both the most typical, as well as the most unusual, legislation has been necessary.
14. There are, however, certain areas where aliens are treated differently, such as in
local requirements for filing security bonds. This is not especially offensive, however,
as long as the amounts of such ,bonds are reasonable. New York State, for .example,
requires non-residents to post security bonds. C.P.L.R. § 8501(a). Also, aliens can
generally be expelled from Latin American countries if they are considered. threats to
internal stability, which, is understandable in view of the border disputes,, skirmishes,

and wars of post-independence years. The Honduran Constitution, art. 29, provides
that "the executive branch has the exclusive authority to require any foreigner whose
presence is deemed unsuitable to leave the national territory, in conformity with the
law." Constitution of the Republic of Honduras 1965 (Pan American Union ed. 1966).
In Argentina see Ley No. 17,401, Represi6n del Communismo, art. 14, Boletin Oficial
29/VIII/67. The cancellation of residence permits is on the administrative, rather than
the judicial, level and, as in Surinam, an appeal to the court system may not lie (personal interviews with members of Surinamese Bar). Also, there may sometimes appear
to be a difference in the treatment accorded, to non-resident, as opposed to resident,
aliens. For example, art. 150 of the 1967. Brazilian Constitution, which guarantees
aliens the same civil rights as Brazilians, does not apply to non-residents. O.D.
PaEnmA, A CoNsTucAo nooBRAsm, 532 (1967).
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Argentine Constitution states that "Foreigners enjoy in the territory
of the Nation all of the civil rights of a citizen," which includes the
right to appear in court and to the due process of law guaranteed in
article 18 of said constitution. 15 This is supplemented by Argentina's
adherence to the 1928 Convention on the Status of Aliens, which
states in article 5: "States should extend to foreigners, domiciled or
in transit through their territory, all individual guaranties extended to
their own nationals, and the enjoyment of essential civil rights without detriment, as regards foreigners, to legal provisions governing the
scope of and usages of the exercise of said rights and guaranties."' 6
Article 285 of the Argentine Commercial Code allows unregistered
which
foreign companies to conduct business activities in Argentina,
7
has been interpreted to mean they can also bring suit.'
The Honduran Constitution in article 25 states that "In Honduras
foreigners enjoy all the civil rights of Hondurans with such restrictions
as may be established by law for reasons of public order, security, or
national interest." 8 Article 150 of the 1967 Brazilian Constitution
guarantees resident foreigners the civil rights of Brazilians, including
the right to habeas corpus, the right to defend in court, the right to
judicial assistance, and the right to "make representation to and to
petition the public powers in defense of rights or against abuses of
authority."' 9 Under article 74 of the Guatemalan Constitution, "Every
person has free access to the courts for the purposes of exercising
his rights of action in accordance with the law." The context of the
clearly that "person" includes aliens as well as
article indicates
20
citizens.
15. Article 18 states in part: "No inhabitant of the Nation may be punished without
previous trial, based on an earlier law than the date of the offense, nor tried by special
commissions, nor removed from judges designated by law before the date of the
offense. No one can be compelled to testify against himself, nor be arrested except
by virtue of a written order from a competent authority. The defense, by trial, of the
person and of rights is inviolable." CoNsrrrmoN oF TIm REPunLic oF ARGENTINA
, LEGAL CONDrTIoNs Eon
1853 (Pan American Union ed. 1963). See H.B. VA
FoREIGN PrVATE INVESTMENT IN ARcENTIA 2-3 (1967).

& J. RODmUz16. 46 Stat. 2753, T. S. 815; reprinted in app. II, W. GoLDscm=nv
AmircAN-ARcENTINE PRIvATE INTERNATIONAL LAw (1966).

NovAs,

17. H.B. VAmA, supra note 15; ConIo DE Comcmo 45 1889, art. 285, (30th ed.
1960). Although each of the Argentine provinces has its own Code of Civil Procedure,
the Commercial Code is of nation-wide application.
18. CoNxsrroN OF = REPuLImC OF HoNDunAs 1965 (Pan American Union ed.
1966).
19. O.D. PEREMA, supra note 14.
20. Article 74 reads in full: "Every person has free access to the courts for the
purpose of exercising his rights of action in accordance with the law. Foreigners may
have recourse to diplomatic channels only in the event of a denial of justice. The mere
fact that a decision may be adverse to their interests is not to be considered as such.
In any case the legal recourses established by Guatemalan laws must have been
exhausted." CONsTTrUTION OF T=E REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA 1965 (Pan American
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In Peru, article 23 of the constitution states that "The Constitution
and the laws afford protection to, and carry obligations equally for,
all the inhabitants of the republic."21 No distinction is drawn between
alien or citizen "inhabitants." The content of the "protection" referred
to in the constitution is illuminated by the 1963 Ley Orgdnica del

Poder Judicial del Perd,2 article 1 of which states: "The function of
administering justice is the prerogative of the Judicial Power and is

exercised by its competent courts and tribunals in accordance with the
constitution and the law."23 Article 3 then establishes guarantees for
the administration of justice, including an inalienable right of defense
in proceedings held in open court, the right to a reasoned judgment

with an exposition of the law relied upon, and assurance that cases

once concluded will not be reopened. 24
It is interesting to note that in December, 1959, the Peruvian
Congress resolved to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,25 which in article 8 states: "Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by

law."2 6 Eventually, on December 15, 1965, the Declarationwas incorporated into the laws of the Republic,27 thus supplementing guarantees of access and fair judicial treatment already available in

Peruvian domestic law.2
Union ed. 1966).
Other Latin American constitutions also grant aliens access to their courts. See, e.g.,
art. 6(h) of the Bolivian Constitution and art. 169 of the Ecuadorian Constitution.
CoNsvrruroN OF
E REPUBLIc OF BoLIVIA 1961 (Pan American Union ed. 1963);
CONsTITON OF THE REPUBLIC OF EcuAnoR 1946 (Pan American Union ed. 1961).
21. CoNsTrrUrION OF THE REU BLic OF PEau (Pan American Union ed. 1965).
22. Decreto Ley No. 14605 de 25 de julio de 1963; El Peruano 26 July, 1963, as
amended, 19 August, 1963, discussed in, A.A. AaRsnuxu MENCIIACA, LA RIECEPTON
iE LA DECLARACIoN UNmvERsAL DE Dmxcmos HumANos EN EL, DERE HO PERUANo Y
sus EFEcros INTEwrACIONALES 10 (UNESCO/SS/HR/22, October 1, 1965).
23. Id.
24. Article 3(b),(c),(d) and (e). Also, art. 3(f) and (g) guarantee litigants the
right to "compensation for judicial errors committed in criminal cases, after review
as prescribed by law," and "the right of petition against the State for delicts committed by members of the Judiciary in the exercise of their duties, or by officers of
other branches of government respecting the execution and compliance with judicial
decisions and orders." Article 3(h) obliges the executive branch, on pain of legal
liability, to enforce judicial decisions and orders.
25. Decreto Ley No. 13282 de 9 diciembre 1959; 1959 Normas Legales Nos. 29-31
at 493.
26. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., 3d Sess.
(I), Resolutions (A/810) (1948).
27. Order of 15 diciembre 1965; cited in A.A. APAmuRu MENCHACA, supra note
22, at 5.
28. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Aramburu Menchaga for his excellent explanation
of the Peruvian legal system in general, and of the reception of the Declaration of
Human Rights in particular, during several personal interviews in Lima, Peru, in
February, 1967.
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However, while the grant of access to, and relief in, national
tribunals is indeed commendable, it is often more mandatory than
permissive. That is, certain national constitutions and other legislation specifically require aliens to seek relief solely in local tribunals,
denying or limiting any right to request diplomatic intervention by
their own states.
III. Ti

CALvo AND NATIONAL TREATMENT
THE INTERNATIONAL

STANDARD

DOCTaRNES

VERSUS

OF JUSTICE

Prevailing Latin American legal opinion holds that aliens are
entitled only to equal treatment with nationals and should rely upon
local tribunals for redress of injuries. Consequently, with certain
exceptions, aliens should not be permitted to invoke the diplomatic
protection of their State of origin. This, the Doctrine of National
Treatment, conflicts with the International Standard of Justice, which
demands a higher standard for aliens if the treatment accorded
29
nationals does not conform to international due process concepts.
While Latin American states have been criticized for invoking the
Doctrine of National Treatment to avoid responsibilities to aliens,3°
I suggest that the Doctrine was originally evolved to encourage aliens
to work and invest in Latin America, rather than to restrict their
29. The International Standard of Justice is less precise than the standard of national
or equal treatment. It holds that the treatment accorded a country's own nationals is
irrelevant as far as aliens are concerned, since aliens have a claim to a minimum
standard of legal treatment that is not less than that promised by the "universal"
standards of "civilized" states. Former United States Secretary of State Elihu Root
once stated, concerning the minimum standard: "There is a standard of justice, very
simple, very fundamental, and of such general acceptance by all civilized countries as
to form a part of the international law of the world. The condition upon which
any country is entitled to measure the justice due from it to an alien by the justice
it accords its own citizens is that its system of law and administration shall conform
to this general standard." Cited and discussed in F. DuNN, TiiE PROTECTION Or
NATIONALS

141-43 (1932).

30. The national standard of treatment, it has been suggested, was not designed
to protect aliens, "hut to protect the state from the alien, extraordinary though it
may sound." A. ROTH, TiE MummNIm STANmAnD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO
ALIENs 117 (1949). Or, as one commentator has explained: "As for the countries
of investment, their political and social structure left them badly prepared to meet the
demands of their position. The instability of their public life, marked as it was by
coups d'etat, and by insurgent or revolutionary, movements, often impaired the normal
operation of their administrative and judicial institutions. The frequency of damage
to aliens in these circumstances, and the absence of adequate legal remedies, exposed
their governments to numerous claims against which they tried to arm themselves by
propounding various doctrines more consonant with their own interests than with the
rules of customary law. This was the reflection of a special psychology adequately
explained by historical differences-a political survival which has already been reduced
by changes in the ratio of interests and forces, and which doubtless one day will be
entirely eliminated." C. DE Visc=E, THEORY AND REAL
Nt PN LIc INTERNATIONAL
LAW

270-71 (1957).
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rights or activities. In colonial times foreigners suffered certain
disabilities in terms of, residence rights, trade and commerce. 31 Upon
independence, however, the new nations sought to attract foreign
trade and, as in Argentina, to encourage foreign immigration by
assuring aliens that they would be accorded the same privileges as
nationals. Thus, article 20 of the 1853 Argentine Constitution provided, as already noted, that "Foreigners enjoy in the territory of the
Nation all of the civil rights of citizens,"3 2 while the 1853 ArgentineUnited States Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation as33
sured free access to courts for nationals of both contracting parties.
However, despite proclaimed good intentions by Latin American governments, the civil wars, revolutions and general lawlessness of postindependence years occasioned injury to alien persons and property
to prevent, and for which
which government officials were powerless
34
judicial relief was not always available.
While in Asia and Africa such events served to justify territorial
acquisitions, this was not generally possible in Latin America. The
new nations, while weak, were nevertheless sovereign and could command the loyalty of their unruly populaces against foreign invasion.3 5
Moreover, the Monroe Doctrine and the policies of the British
31. Spain's constant, and ultimately futile, attempt to prevent non-Spaniards from
trading with the New World is related in J. PARRY, supra note 2, at 116-35, 251-71.
32. The writings of the versatile Juan Bautista Alberdi, who urged -encouragement
of immigration of European peoples and capital as the best means of assuring national
prosperity after the sterile years of the Rosas dictatorship, greatly influenced the draftsmen who produced the 1853 Constitution. H. H.AnNG, supra' note 3, at 610-11;
T. McGANN, supra note 2, at 28-29. Between 1857 and 1900, approximately 2,000,000
immigrants arrived, mostly from Spain and Italy, although some 800,000 were seasonal
agricultural workers who returned to Europe. Between 1900 and 1930, another
2,900,000 disembarked in Buenos' Aires and remained. T. FiLLoL,- supra note 2, at
26-27. The effect of this extraordinary tide of European immigration and European
influence upon Argentin6 social and political patterns has been a subject of wide
debate. C. IBArtEGREN, LA HiSTonrA QuE HE Vrvrro 69 (1954); R. RojAs, LA
IESTAURACION NAcIONALISTA 53 (2d ed. 1922). DITELLA, ARGENTINA, SOCIEDAD DE
MAsAs 85-123 (1965). Manuel Galvez 'wrote: "In Buenos Aires there is a lack of
an aesthetic sense, just as there is a lack of an ethical sense, because it is a city of
immigrants. The immigrants came to the country with the single idea of wealth. They
are hungry, demoralized people who worship money." EL DrA1Uo DE GABRIEL
"
QUrMOGA 185 (1910).
33. 10 Stat. 1005, T.S. 4; I. Malloy 20 (Effective Dec. 20, 1954).
34. For an illuminating first-hand account of the confusion and anarchy permeating
Central America in the early post-independence years, see generally J. STEPHENS, INcIC
CHIAPAS & YUCATAN (1841);" ee also
DENTS OF TRAVEL IN CENTRAL -AMcA,
T. KANES, THE FAILuRE oF.UNIoN: CENTRL AMERICA 1824-1960 at 12-95 (1961,),

and A. JABEcuI, 3 LA AmERIcA CENTRAL ANTE LA HISTORA -137-58 (1949). For
q
a description of Mexico see F. DimN; DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF AnMICZAS
MEXIco 117-65 (1933).
35. The expulsion in 1807 of invading English troops by the -poorly-ahned_:populace
of Buenos Aires, although it took place before independence, was a "case in point.
H. HARING, supra note 3, at 270-71; J. PARRY, supra note 2, at-'346-47.
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Government discouraged European territorial conquest, while domestic considerations, such as preoccupation with the western frontier
and with digesting the gains of the Mexican War, temporarily blunted
United States territorial appetites.3
Therefore, diplomatic intervention and protection were utilized,
after appeals to local courts proved unavailing, in attempts to obtain,
by more subtle means, the protection of alien interests endangered by
political turmoil. In the words of Frederick S. Dunn, this device
"served as a substitute for territorial conquest in bringing the Latin
American states within the orbit of international trade and intercourse,
and, while the results obtained were not what these countries might
have desired, the probable alternatives would have been far less desirable from their standpoint."3
When, however, Latin Americans became aware that diplomatic
protection was being abused, their jurists looked anew at the National
Treatment concept, seeking to turn it to protective ends. Indeed, it
would seem, in retrospect, as if diplomatic insistence for redress of
injuries often depended more on political, than on legal, considerations. As one commentator writes: "There has been at times a striking
parallel between the upward and downward curve of American
territorial and economic ambitions, and the concern with which
American officials seemed to regard reported injuries to Americans in
Mexico ....The same events which in times of mounting ambitions
took on an aspect of extreme gravity were at other times treated as
minor misfortunes that might happen in any country."m Also, assertion
of international claims was considered to have been used to justify
armed invasion and occupation, as in the French expeditions to
Mexico in 1838 and 1861, the United States interventions in the
Caribbean after 1900, and in the 1902-03 German, British and Italian
threat to Venezuela. 39 At the same time, distrustful of local tribunals
where available, aliens often would appeal first to their local diplo40
matic representatives before seeking relief in local courts.

Since aliens insisted that rights to intervene on behalf of nationals
were posited upon international law, it was on this level that the
36. D. PERKINs, A HIsToRY OF THE MosmoE DocTRINE (1955). For similar reasons
the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction was not utilized in Latin America as it was
in Asia and Africa. D. SEA, Trr CALVO CLAusE 4-5 (1955).
37. F. DUNN, supra note 29, at 58. Prof. Dunn's study of the historical development
of diplomatic protection is most informative and helpful. Id. at 46-66. Prof. Edwin
Borchard defined diplomatic interposition or intervention as "the pressure of a claim
by official representations, under the authority and in the name of the government."
THE DIPLOMATIC PROTiERsiON oF CTzENs ABROAD 441 (1915).
38. F. DUNN, supra note 34, at 7-8.
39. F. DuNx, supra note 29, at 57; D. SHEA, supra note 36, at 12-13.
40. D. SnEA, supra note 36, at 10.
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Latin Americans counter-attacked. Shortly before 1870, the Argentine
diplomat and jurist Dr. Carlos Calvo began formulating a comprehensive formula to restrict diplomatic interposition. 41 His so-called
Calvo Doctrine was based upon two principles: first, sovereign states,
being free and independent, enjoy the right, on the basis of equality,
to freedom from interference by other states, either through force
or diplomacy; and, second, aliens are not entitled to rights and
privileges not accorded nationals. Therefore, they may seek redress
for grievances only in local courts.42 These twin concepts of nonintervention and absolute denial of diplomatic protection are the
core of the Calvo Doctrine, which in turn may be considered a corollary of the Doctrine of National or Equal Treatment.
The non-intervention portion of the Calvo Doctrine has been accepted by the United States in principle since the 1933 Montevideo
Conference, although recent events in the Dominican Republic might
indicate the contrary.4 3 However, the Latin American conception of
non-intervention also entails denial of diplomatic intervention on
behalf of aliens, a broad definition not acceptable to the United States,
which defines intervention more restrictively and does not consider
itself obliged to avoid intervening on its citizens' behalf, especially
where there has been a denial of justice. 44
Attempts to assure acceptance of the second portion of the Calvo
Doctrine have assumed the form of constitutional provisions, municipal legislation, and contractual stipulations between aliens and
Latin American states. Some of these attempts acknowledge rights
to intervene in cases of denial of justice, others do not.
For example, the Honduran Constitution provides: "Aliens may not
have recourse to diplomatic channels except in cases of a denial of
justice. For these purposes denial of justice is not understood to
41. Contained in his monumental, six volume work, LE Dnorr INTERNATIONAL
1896).
19; H. DE VINs & J. RODRIGUEz-NovAS, supra note
2, at 99-100.
43. One commentator suggests that it is questionable if unilateral intervention will
ever be completely discarded as a policy alternative as long as there exists no effective multilateral machinery for dealing with problems of hemispheric subversion.
Kane, American Involvement in Latin American Civil Strife, 1967 PROC. AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. 58 (1967).
44. H. DE Vnmns & J. RoDmrGuEz-NovAs, supra note 2, at 101-02, indicate that the
Inter-American Juridical Committee defined intervention to include "Acts by which
it is attempted to impose or there is imposed upon a state the recognition of a
privileged status for aliens beyond the rights, remedies, and guaranties granted to its
nationals under local law." The United States representative on the committee vigorously dissented, stating: "Normal diplomatic protection of the lives and property
of citizens abroad under international law should not be included . . . under the
guise of intervention. The use of the term intervention in this sense is a misnomer."
Id.
TiioRiQuE ET PRATIQUE (Paris ed.
42. D. SHEA, supra note 36, at
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mean an executed verdict that is unfavorable to the claimant. Should
this provision be contravened, and claims are not terminated amicably,
resulting in loss to the country, the claimant shall forfeit his rights
to live in the country."45 Article 14 of the Guatemalan Constitution
states: "Foreigners may have recourse to diplomatic channels only in
the event of a denial of justice. The mere fact that a decision may
be adverse to their interests is not to be considered as such. In
any case, the legal recourses
established by Guatemalan laws must
46
have been exhausted."

Article 32 of the Peruvian Constitution provides, however, without
reference to denial of justice: "Foreigners as regards property are in
the same conditions as Peruvians without being able in any case to
invoke an exceptional position in this respect or have recourse to
diplomatic claims." 47 The Costa Rican Constitution, in a slight variation on this theme, states in article 19 that aliens ".

.

. are subject to

the jurisdiction of the courts of justice and the authorities of the
Republic, and may not resort to diplomatic intervention except
as provided in international conventions." 48
Where constitutional provisions allow intervention in cases of denial
of justice, they confirm general international practice which requires
exhaustion of local remedies and perpetration of a denial of justice
before diplomatic interposition is permitted. 49 However, state practice, arbitral decisions, and the opinions of publicists deny the efficacy
of provisions unconditionally barring diplomatic protection otherwise
justified under international law, on the grounds that limitations on the
responsibility of states for injuries to aliens are determined by inter.
50
national, not municipal, law.

Latin Americans have been more successful in implementing the
Calvo Doctrine by including in contract provisions binding aliens
to local redress and obligating them to eschew diplomatic protection
in disputes stemming from the contractual relationship. 5' This is
somewhat different from a unilateral attempt to impose the Doctrine
45. CONSTrUTION OF THE BEPUBLIC OF HoNDnUAs, supranote 18.
46. CONISTITUIoN OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA, supra note 20. See alo art.
20 of the CoNsTrTUToN OF BoLvA, supra note 20.
47. CoNsTrrTUnoN OF TnE REPuBmLIC OF PERU, supra note 21.
48. CONSTUTON OF TE REPUBLIC OF COSTA RICA 1949 (Pan American ed. 1961);
Art. 20 of the CoNsTrruTIoN OF TI= REPUBLIc OF BoLIVA 1961 (Pan American ed.
1963) states "Foreign subjects and enterprises are subject to Bolivian laws and in no
case may they invoke exceptional position or have recourse to diplomatic claims."
49. See notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the "exhaustion
of local remedies rule."
50. D. SHAe, supra note 36, at 25. Attempts to incorporate the Doctrine in treaties

and other municipal legislation have not been fruitful. Id. at 21-24, 26-27.
51. See discussions in D. SHEA, supra note 36, at 27-32; F. DUNN, supra note 29,
at 169-72.
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through municipal law, since here the individual purports specifically
to waive his rights to diplomatic protection. The voluntary nature
of this waiver is, however, sometimes open to question, since aliens
may be forced to subscribe to such clauses as the price for doing
business in foreign jurisdictions. For example, article 17 of the
Peruvian Constitution provides: "Mercantile companies, national or
foreign, are subject, without restrictions to the laws of the Republic.
In every State contract with foreigners, or in the concessions in the
latter's favour, it must be expressly stated that they must submit to
the laws and tribunals of the Republic and renounce all diplomatic
claims."5 2
Nevertheless, if the clause exempts denials of justice, it may be
considered as merely declarative of general international principles,
and thus superfluous but proper. If drawn sufficiently broadly to
exclude denials of justice from diplomatic recourse, the clause becomes more controversial. In such cases the United States maintains
that Calvo Clauses will not prevent interposition otherwise permissible under generally recognized rules of international law. On the
Vatelian theory that any injury to the alien also vicariously injures
his state, the state has an independent right of action which the
individual cannot waive. However, the United States does not consider insertion of Calvo Clauses in contracts as improper, and refuses
to advise citizens not to make such commitments. Moreover, it is not
uninfluenced, in deciding whether or not to espouse a claim, by the
execution of such a renunciation, and regards it as binding on the
individual.53 Also, as a matter of policy, the United States Department
of State does not espouse contract claims of citizens against other
states absent a breach of substantive international law, such as a gross
denial of justice.54
52. CONSTITUTION OF TE REPUBLIC OF PERU, supra note 21. A typical Calvo
Clause which the laws of Mexico require to be inserted in the charters of all corporations having foreign shareholders provides: "Every alien who at the time of formation
of a company, or at any time thereafter, acquires or may acquire an interest or participation in said company shall be considered by that simple fact as a Mexican in connection thereof, and it shall be understood that he agrees not to invoke the protection
of his government under the penalty, in case of breach of this agreement, of losing
his interest or participation to the Mexican Nation." Decree of June 29, 1944, Diario
Oficial, July 7, 1944. See also art. 27 of the CoNsrrrunoN OF 1917. While most
Latin American states require Calvo Clauses in public contracts, Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay do not. D. SHEA, supra note 36, at 269-80. For early discussions of the
enforceability of a Calvo Clause, see E. BoRcHAcD, THE DIPLOMATC PROTECrON OF
CrrszNs ABRoAD 792 et seq. (1915). For a more recent brief commentary, see
UNrrm STATES TRADE AM IVNi sTM T Ix LAm AMrCA 45-48 (Columbia Society
of International Law eds. 1963). See also CoNsrrToN OF REPUBLic OF EcuADO,
art. 177, supra note 20.
53. D. SHEA, supra note 36, at 45.
54. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and
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Despite international refusal to recognize the intrinsic value of the
Doctrine of National Treatment as a precept of international, as

opposed to Latin American law, it still influences contemporary
events. Reluctance to deviate from adherence to the Doctrine, and
thereby perhaps subject themselves to an international standard in
the nineteenth century formulation of which they had little voice, 5

motivates current Latin American refusal to execute multilateral
agreements which define international compensation standards in any
but the broadest terms,56 or to adhere to the World Bank's Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between the States
57
and Nationals of other States.
ForeignAffairs, 56 AM. J.INT'L L. 663, 662 (1962).
55. With respect to the major role played by European legal and political presuppositions in developing the law of responsibility for injury to aliens, see F. DUNN, supra
note 29, at 53-54; Dawson & Weston, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: New
Wine in Old Bottles, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 63, 73-75 (1963); Fatouros, International Law
and the Third World, 50 VA. L. REv. 783, 807-09 (1964); Cuba Roy, Is the Law of
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?,
55 Am. J. INT'L L. 863, 866 (1961). It is interesting to note that even nations such
as Argentina, which does not incorporate the Calvo Doctrine in its constitution or other
legislation, and which does not require Calvo Clauses in Government contracts, nevertheless espouses the Doctrine of National Treatment.
56. R. LmLrcH, Thm PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMXENT 190 (1965); Metzger,
Property in InternationalLaw, 50 VA. L. REv. 594, 598-600, 622-23 (1964). The 1962
Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on "Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources" seeks to please all members and therefore incorporates both national
and international compensatory standards, as well as the obligation to exhaust local
remedies. "[T]he owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with
the rules in force in the state taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty
and in accordance with international law. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the state taking such
measures shall be exhausted." UN Gen. Ass. Off. Res. 17th Sess., Plenary 1194
(A/RES/1803 (XVII) (1902). Reprinted in Metzger, supra at 601-02. This attitude
also accounts for the lack of friendship, commerce and navigation treaties between
the United States and Latin American nations incorporating compensation clauses. Id.
at 614. The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United
States and Nicaragua is an exception. (Article VI (4)). 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No.
4024, 367 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective May 24, 1958).
57. The author has been told in personal interviews with attorneys in Rio de
Janeiro and Buenos. Aires that this is because contracting states are obliged to comply
with awards in proceedings to which they have been parties and, it is feared, the
particular arbitration panel involved may not have been inclined toward the equal or
national treatment theory and will thereby accord aliens more favorable treatment
than nationals. However, in The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes:
Some Observations on Jurisdiction,5 CoLum. J.OF TBANSNAT'L. L. 262 (1966), Aaron
Broches Esq., General Counsel of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, points out that "the fact that a State has become a party to the Convention.
does not obligate that State or an investor who is a national of that State to make
use of the facilities of the Centre [the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes established by the Convention]. No State and no investor can
be brought before a conciliation commission or an arbitral tribunal without having
consented thereto." Id. at 264. Elsewhere Mr. Broches seeks more specifically to
allay Latin American fears that the Convention would violate "the constitutional

1968]

A SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

The alien in Latin America is also channeled into the local tribunals by the exhaustion of local remedies rule, which requires
pursuing avenues of judicial and administrative relief available in the
foreign state before invoking diplomatic protection.s8 As a procedural device for allocating jurisdiction between the national and
the international legal orders, it has long been accepted as a basic
proposition of international law. 5 9 When, however, aliens are denied
recourse to local tribunals or when recourse would be fruitless, the
rule need not be observed 6 and an appeal to the diplomatic arena
principle of equality of citizens and aliens," would introduce compulsory arbitration
and thus infringe upon the sovereignty of the Latin American states, and would
evidence "an unacceptable lack of confidence in the integrity and independence of
the national courts." The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 9
A.B.A. IN'r'L & Co mp. L. SECTON BuLL. No. 11, 14-15 (1965).
58. Many policy justifications for the rule have been given by commentators.
E. Borchard suggests five: "First, the citizen going abroad is presumed to take into
account the means furnished by local law for the redress of wrongs; secondly, the
right of sovereignty and independence warrants the local state in demanding for its
courts freedom from interference, on the assumption that they are capable of doing
justice; thirdly, the home government of the complaining citizen must give the
offending government an opportunity of doing justice to the injured party in its own
regular way, and thus avoid, if possible, all occasion for international discussion;
fourthly, if the injury is committed by an individual or minor official, the exhaustion
of local remedies is necessary to make certain that the wrongful act or denial of
justice is the deliberate act of the state; and fifthly, if it is a deliberate act of the
state, that the state is willing to leave the wrong unrighted." Supra note 37, at 817-18.
Professor Richard B. Lillich states that "the main rationale behind the rule remains
the same: the desire to settle disputes between aliens and states on the local level
rather than make them matters of international concern." The Effectiveness of the
Local Remedies Rule Today, 1964 PRoc. Am. Soc'y INT'L L. 10. Another commentator
suggests that it is "a normal manifestation of a constant human tendency to dislike
and resist outside intrusion in private affairs" and that private, rather than public
"processes are generally more efficient because the investigation is done by those
close to the event." Mummery, The Content of the Duty to Exhaust Local Judicial
Remedies, 58 AM. J. INTL L. 389, 391 (1964).
59. The International Court of Justice in the Interhandel Case (Switzerland v.
United States) has declared that "the rule that local remedies must be exhausted before
international proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary
international law; the rule has been generally observed in cases in which a State has
adopted the cause of its national whose rights are claimed to have been disregarded in
another State in violation of international law .... ." [19591 I.C.J. 6, 27. See also
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, P.C.IJ. Ser. A/B No. 76 (1939). This principle is
also recognized by the United States Supreme Court which, in Sabbatino v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), stated "the usual method for an individual
to seek relief is to exhaust local remedies and then repair to the executive authorities of
his own state to persuade them to champion his claim in diplomacy or before an
international tribunal." Id. at 422-23. Similarly, international agreements recognize the
validity of this proposition. For example, while the 1907 Convention establishing the
Central American Court of Justice allowed individuals to invoke its jurisdiction, they
had first to exhaust local remedies. M. HUDSON, Tm PERMANENT CoURT OF IN rznNATIONAL JUsTCE 49 (1943); Hudson, The Central American Court of Justice,
26 Am. J. INTL L. 759 (1932).
60. Head, A Fresh Look at the Local Remedies Rule, 1967 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 142,
151-55 (1967). Sometimes the fruitlessness of invoking ostensibly available local
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will lie on the theory that there has been a denial of procedural
justice or of international due process. 61 A denial of justice would
arise, according to a United States Department of State Memorandum
on Cuba, if there were a "denial or unwarranted obstruction of access
to ...courts, gross deficiency or delay in judicial process, manifestly

unjust judgment or an atmosphere of hostility or prejudice62 which
would make it futile to attempt to exhaust local remedies."
63
The expression "denial of procedural justice" is admittedly vague,
although there have been various attempts, by positing the requirements of a fair trial, to give it meaningful content. The famous
1929 Harvard Draft Convention on Responsibility of States for
Damage Done on their Territory to the Person or Property of
Foreigners suggested that municipal legal systems should avoid (1)
denial of, delay or unwarranted obstruction of access to courts; (2)
gross inefficiency in the administration of the judicial or administrative
process; and (3) failure to provide those guarantees generally considered indispensable to the proper administration of justice.64
Article 7 of the 1961 HarvardDraft Convention on the International
Responsibility of States for Inquiries to Aliens and section 181 of the
American Law Institute's Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
remedies may be due to political, rather than purely legal, factors. For example, local
counsel may be so intimidated that they will be unwilling to represent an alien. In
Cuba, members of the Havana Bar refused to appeal the expropriations initiated by
the Castro Government, and, according to a prominent New York City attorney with
wide international experience, indicated "that the personal risk involved in taking these
American cases was too great." UN= STATES TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN LATIN
AmERICA 42 (Columbia Society of International Law ed. 1963).
61. The ALI's RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE
UNITED STATES (1965) [hereinafter referred to as the RESTATEMENT] in § 213 excuses
compliance with the exhaustion of local remedies rule when available remedies "would
not satisfy the requirements of procedural justice," when "exhaustion would be clearly
.ineffective in view of one or more prior determinations made, on substantially identical
claims, by the highest agency of the state that has authority to grant relief," or when
"the state of the alien's nationality, which has espoused his claim, is asserting in
its own behalf a claim arising out of the same wrongful conduct."
62. Reprinted in Kerley, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 165, 166 (1962). In reference to Cuba the
United States Department of State took the position that the unavailability of local
remedies waived the requirement. Lillich, The Cuban Claims Act of 1964, 51 A.B.A.J.
445, 447 n.26 (1965).
63. The RESTATEMENT, supra note 61, in § 178 defines "denial of procedural justice"
as ". . . conduct, attributable to a state and causing injury to an alien, that departs
from the international standard of justice . ..with respect to the procedure followed
in enforcement of the state's law as it affects the alien in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings, including the determination of his rights against, or obligations to,
other persons."
64. 23 Am. J. INT'L L. SPEC. No. 133 (1929).
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of the United States assert that to receive a fair trial an alien must:
(a) have the benefit of an impartial tribunal or administrative authority; (b) receive specific information in advance of the charges against
him; (c) have time to prepare his case; (d) have full opportunity
to know the substance and source of any evidence against him and
to contest its validity; (e) have the opportunity to obtain witnesses
and evidence on his behalf; (f) have the opportunity to obtain and
consult with legal counsel of his own choice, if necessary free of
charge if this is provided to aliens; (g) have access to the services
of an interpreter if needed; (h) be able to communicate with representatives of his own government and to have such representative
present at the proceedings; and (i) obtain disposition of his case
with reasonable dispatch.6 5 The Draft Convention would also confer
upon aliens "any other procedural right conferred by a treaty or
recognized by the principle legal systems of the world."66 Other con-

siderations might include denial of rights to appeal, executive interference in litigation or in the execution of judgment, unconscionably
short limitations periods, stringent security deposits, or restrictions
imposed by local codes upon admissibility of evidence. 67
Close examination of national procedural codes becomes especially
relevant if aliens are granted, under the Doctrine of National Treatment, the same rights as citizens to appear and litigate in national
courts. Inquiry then is no longer confined to ascertaining if discrimination exists against aliens, but must proceed to considering whether
procedural codes, in letter or application, accord all litigants a
procedural due process acceptable under international law.68

65. Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens, Draft No. 12, April 15, 1961, Reporters, Sohn and Baxter, Harvard Law
School, pp. 90-91, 55 Am. J. INT L L. 545, 550 (1961); RESTATEMNT supra note 61,
at

§

181.

For an appraisal of the RESTATE mEr with relation to the international

standard of justice, see Murphy, State Responsibility for Inquiries to Aliens, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 125 (1966).
66. Supra note 65, art. 7(k).
67. Head, supra note 60 at 157-58. For an extensive outline of factors to be considered, see Dawson, International Law and the Procedural Rights of Aliens Before
National "Tribunals,17 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 404, 418-20 (1968).
68. While a procedural code may superficially seem perfectly fair to both aliens and
nationals, if it is improperly administered a denial of justice claim may be raised. However, the quality of the administration of justice varies considerably from time to time,

so that while administration might be grossly deficient during one period, it might
be entirely adequate during another. This leads one to be cautious in making sweeping generalizations concerning any particular Latin American nation, especially since
the overwhelming trend has been to seek to improve the administration of justice. See
Dawson, Professional Interchange Among Lawyers in the Americas, 53 A.B.A.J. 903
(1967).
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ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

AND T=E ENFORCEmENT OF CVL PLIGHTs

Observers of the Latin American scene sometimes incorrectly pre-

sume that, due to political climates unstable in relation to our own,
Latin American courts and judges will be incompetent at best, and
corrupt at worst. They fail to realize that typical Latin American
disorders, except in the immediate contexts of social revolutions such

as swept Mexico and Cuba, do not necessarily disrupt all institutions

in a particular society. 69 Thus, members of the judiciary normally

remain in office untouched despite military coups. There are unfortunate exceptions. In the 1966 Argentine revolution the entire Federal

Supreme Court was dismissed and replaced, although intermediate
and lower federal and provincial courts were not affected.
In general, however, commercial life goes on, and in nations
dependent upon international trade for a great portion of their gross
national product it could not be any other way. There has, therefore,

been little or no interference with the legal process in normal civil
and commercial matters. There are, nevertheless, two major potential

problem areas, both of which may be aggravated by political and
economic disorder. These are the administration of justice and the
enforcement of civil rights.
A. The Administrationof Justice
The judicial power in Latin America exists within the traditional
tripartite division of government into executive, legislative, and judicial branches.70 The executive branch is generally considered the
69. Latin American courts are usually organized within a unitary system, with a
supreme court in the capital, superior courts located in other principal cities, and lower
courts extending down to justice of the peace tribunals in smaller towns and villages.
Argentina, however, possesses a dual system of federal and provincial courts much
like our own, with the possibility of removal from one system to another. H. Dr
VnEs & J. RoDmGuEz-NovAs, TiE LAw OF THE AErlucAs 111-17 (1965). CONSTITUTiox OF THE REPUBLIC OF AGmETInA 1853, § III (Pan American Union ed. 1963).
Eder, Judicial Review in Latin America, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 570, 575-76 (1960).
Brazil, although nominally a federation, has increasingly drawn away from dual federal
and state courts so that the great majority of Brazilian courts are administered autonomously by the various states. There is, however, a federal supreme court and a
federal appellate court, as well as special military, labor and electoral courts. Brazilian
state courts operate under standard procedural rules of federal origin. H. Dr Vnms &
J. RODIUGUZz-NovAs, supra at 195-98; CoNsrrTnoN OF BRAzIL 1967, chap. VIII,
(Pan American Union ed. 1967). By contrast, in Argentina each province has its own
procedural code, although some members of the Federal Government told the author
in the course of personal interviews in Buenos Aires that they hope the new 1968
Federal Code of Civil Procedure will be adopted by all the provinces as well.
70. In general, judges are appointed by one branch with the approval of another,
although in Brazil federal legislation provides for a career judiciary in which judges
retain almost complete control over the selection of their colleagues and successors.
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strongest and the legislative branch the weakest, since the legislature

formulates general legislation and the executive puts it into effect
by reglamentos and executive decrees. The power to issue reglamentos
is very broad, and until a reglamento appears a particular law may
lack enforcement provisions.71 The President, then, in effect has wide
legislative powers, and in times of emergency may legislate by decree,
or may pass so-called decree-laws when the legislature is not in
session or has been disbanded, as is presently the case in Argentina.2
Although the executive is specifically prohibited from interfering
in the exercise of judicial authority, he nevertheless exerts great influ-

ence through the Ministry of Justice and the so-called Government
Attorney, a direct agent of the executive who represents the govern-

ment in criminal cases and in civil cases involving expropriation and

attachment of property.7 3 Further executive intervention into the

judicial realm is illustrated by the coexistence of administrative courts

with ordinary judicial organs.7 4 In addition, there may be, as in Brazil,

special executive courts in the labor, military and electoral areas.75
Paradoxically, however, more effort is expended in preventing the
judicial power from overlapping into the legislative and executive
areas than vice versa. Thus, judicial precedent and stare decisis are
given little weight on the theory that if a judge rendered a decision
which constituted binding precedent for future decisions, he would

be intruding upon the legislative or executive domains,7 6 thereby

H. CLAGF=r, THE ADmnNSTRATION OF JUSTICE IN LA= AmERaCA 32-36 (1952);
Scheman, Brazil's Career Judiciary, 46 J. Am. JUDICATuRE Soc'y 134 (1962).
71. H. Cr.Acrr, supra note 70, at 15.
72. Article 54(3) of the 1967 Constitution of Brazil also provides that if the
President sends a bill to Congress, which he deems "urgent," it automatically becomes
law if Congress does not act upon it within forty days. CoNsTrrtumoN OF BRAZIL 1967
supra note 69, art. 54(3).
73. H. CLAGETT, supra note 70, at 17.

74. H. CLAGmT, supra note 70, at 17-18. In Colombia the Consejo de Estado
functions as the supreme court of the administrative sphere, before which claims
against the government must be brought. Id. at 66. Article 136 of the Constitution
of 1886, which establishes the Consejo, states, "The Supreme Court and the Council
of State shall be equal in rank." CoNsTrrtrbON OF TM REPUBLIC OF COLOMMrA
1886, art. 136 (Pan American Union ed. 1962).
75. H. DE VSUEs & J. RODRIGUEz-NovAS, supra note 69, at 195-98; CLAGE-r, supra
note 70, at 55-115, CoNsTrrutoN OF BRAZIL 1967, supra note 69, art. 120-35.
76. Reluctance to permit legislation by judicial decree may be traced to art. 5
of the Code Napoleon, which, by prohibiting judges from prescribing general principles
of law, sought to prevent a return to the abuses of rule-making powers which characterized pre-Revolutionary tribunals. Eder, supra note 69, at 572; H. DE VRIEs & J.
RODRIcuEz-NovAs, supra note 69, at 193-94. Also relevant is the civil law precept
that custom, and decisions interpreting it, cannot be sources of law. For example, art.
2 of the Civil Code of Honduras states that, "Custom does not constitute a right
except in those cases in which the law refers to it." The Civil Code of Argentina in
art. 1(17) states that, "Usage, custom or practice cannot create rights except when
the laws refer to them." On the European continent, the progenitors of today's
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violating the doctrine of separation of powers. Moreover, in at least
one country, Ecuador, the legislature and not the judiciary is deemed

the guardian and sole interpreter of the constitution.

7

Other nations

restrict to varying degrees the courts' power to declare legislative
or executive acts unconstitutional, except in cases then before them.
These decisions are not always binding upon lower courts and do not

necessarily require legislative revocation of the law found unconsti8
tutional.7
The manner in which Latin American court proceedings are gen-

erally conducted, and the procedural code provisions which govern
the course of the proceedings, may seem unfamiliar to alien litigants

accustomed to common law jurisdictions. Mere unfamiliarity, howcivil law countries from earliest times looked to written codes, such as the Corpus
Juris Civilis of Justinian, as sources of law. See generally J. VANCE, SouncFS or
LATIN AmzRncAN LAw (1943);

C. WALToN, THE CrL

LAW IN SPAIN AND SPANISH

AmmucA (1900). The Corpus Juris Civilis was never accepted in England, where
customs and usages and, eventually, court decisions interpreting and defining them,
came to be the primary source of law. P. EDER, A Co AATrmV Su1Ey or ANGLoAMEuCAN AND LATI-AMERIcAx LAW 4-6 (1950). "The Latin jurist is apt to carry
the analogy of natural physical laws further than we care to. Just as there are natural
laws governing the universe which it is within the province of the scientist to discover,
so there are natural laws, he thinks, governing human relations which it is within
the province of the jurist to ascertain. Within the framework of these natural laws,
it is the duty of the legislator to lay down in advance the rules that shall govern
human conduct and not leave the ascertainment of these rules to the haphazard
decision of the courts when and if private litigants choose to thrash them out at
their own risk and expense." Id. at 7. As a result, in Latin America, decisions cannot,
as in the common law system, constitute binding precedent for future decisions. The
Civil Code of Chile, for example, states in art. 3 that "Judicial decisions have no
binding effect except in the cases in which they are pronounced." Article 17 of the
Colombian Civil Code is almost identical. There are, however, limitations to this
generalization, and the judge's power to interpret abstract code provisions, coupled
with constant improvement in facilities for reporting decisions, as in Venzeuela
and in Argentina, are perhaps eroding in strict application. In Mexico, moreover, a
series of five consecutive decisions by the supreme court on the same constitutional
point will bind all federal and state courts. LEY DE AMIPARo DR 1936, art. 148.
H. CLAGCrr, supra note 70, at 125, and discussion therein. Also, as a practical matter,
lower courts will follow decisions of the supreme court if they wish to avoid being overruled on appeal. See H. DE Vars & J. RoDrtucuz-NovAs, supra note 69, at 197-98.
It is interesting to note, however, that the 1949 Peron amendments to the Argentine
Constitution, which provided in art. 95 that supreme court decisions interpreting the
constitution created judicial precedent binding on all other courts and judges in the
country, did not survive the dictator's downfall. For a brief comment discussing procedures to erradicate the Peron amendments ("the profanities of 1949"), see Montafio,
The Constitutional Problem of the Argentine Republic, 6 Am. J. Comp. L. 340, 344
(1957).
77. "Congress alone has the power to interpret the Constitution in a manner generally obligatory and to resolve doubts which may arise concerning the meaning of
any one or more of its precepts. Thus Congress alone has jurisdiction to declare
whether a law or legislative decree is or is not unconstitutional." THE CoNsurrtioN
or THE REPumIic or EcuAnon 1946, art. 189 (Pan American Union ed. 1961), discussed in Eder, supra note 69, at 573, 597.
78. H. CLAcmEr, supra note 70, at 138-39; Eder, supranote 69, at 610-12.
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ever, hardly justifies pleas of denial of justice, although it underlines
emphatically the necessity of intelligent selection of local counsel,
whose training and legal outlook may differ markedly from that of
his United States counterparts.7 9
Procedure in Latin American lawsuits is largely written, with little
provision for oral testimony in court or for direct or cross-examination
of parties and witnesses by opposing attorneys. The testimony of
witnesses is normally not taken in open court, but before a judge's
secretary or clerk, and then only as to factual matters and upon
written interrogatories supplied by the parties. The clerk, who generally is not a lawyer, reads the questions to the witness and either
records the answers in longhand or on a typewriter. If the answer
is lengthy, he composes a summary. While attorneys representing the
opposing parties may be present, they may not question witnesses
directly, but must use the clerk as an intermediary. In special cir.
cumstances the judge's presence may be requested, but this is usually
not done. The written answers are then placed in the case file, which
the judge reads before rendering his decision.80
Also, the jury trial has never attained the importance in Latin
America which it enjoys in our own country. Although various constitutions mention the right to trial by jury, it is nearly always in
connection with criminal actions, rather than civil cases, and in a
8
number of countries its use is restricted further to libel actions. '
Latin Americans claim that promptness and certainty in the administration of justice would be imperiled if juries were utilized as triers
of facts. 82 Since in most civil law nations judges are career officials,
experience and training supposedly leave them better qualified to
interpret both the facts and the procedural codes' evidentiary provisions which limit their fact-finding discretion. I suggest that the
explanation may have more sociological overtones, and that juries
may ill-suit societies which are not homogeneous, and which are
composed of supreme individualists segregated from each other by
79. Dawson, Professional Interchange Among Lawyers in the Americas, 53 A.B.A.J.
903, 905 (1967).
80. See comparison in EDER, supra note 76, at 37-38, of trials in the United States
and in Latin America. There are, of course, variants from this central theme. Article
366 of the Peruvian Code of Civil Procedure, in providing for testimony by the parties,
allows a litigant, or his attorney, to question the other party directly and orally.
CODIcO DE PR0cEDMMMToS Crvmms, art. 366 (J. Fajardo ed. 1967).
81. See discussion in CLAGETT, supra note 70, at 116-22; EDER, supra note 76, at
39-41. In some countries constitutional provisions for jury trials have never been
implemented, even in criminal actions. Cr-&Grr, supra note 70, at 116-22.
82. CLAGET, supra note 70, at 117-18. The Brazilian experience suggests that the
opposite may be true. P. GCAr..crNo, A BusmNmssmAW's INTRODUcTiON TO BRAZILiAN
LAW AD PrACTICE 22 (1966).
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visible hierarchal distinctions based upon wealth, power, social status,
culture and education. s
In the absence of a jury system, the rules of evidence, which in
Latin America are included within the articles of the codes of procedure, did not develop, as did ours, through accumulation of judicial
precedents designed to prevent juries from being prejudiced or misled. Therefore the complicated judge-made precepts surrounding the
hearsay rule and its exceptions are unknown. Instead, the tendency
is to admit as much evidence as possible, leaving the weighing thereof
to the court. 84
Nevertheless, Latin American codes restrict more narrowly than
we those persons who can testify in court. Article 450 of the Peruvian
Code of Civil Procedure prohibits from serving as witnesses persons
under eighteen years of age, the insane, those deprived of the use of
reason by drunkenness or some other cause at the time the deed occurred about which they are to testify, deaf-mutes who cannot read
or write, persons considered unworthy of belief due to notorious bad
85
habits or vagrancy, perjurors, and those sentenced to prison.
The Argentine Code is not as restrictive, although article 427 excludes spouses and those in direct line of descent from the parties, 86
as does article 453 of the Peruvian Code, with certain limitations.87
Under article 443 of the Argentine Code, questions asked witnesses
must relate only to facts, while article 446 states that anyone who
83. For an interesting profile of the highly individualistic Argentine national character,
with its decidedly European orientation, see T. FILLOL, SOCIAL FACTORS IN EcoNomic
DEvELO
FMENT:
THE ARGENTINE CASE 5-39 (1961). F. Tannenbaum, referring to
Guatemala, with its large Indian populace which participates only marginally in national
economic and political life, writes "there can be no national leadership because culturally
there is no nation." F. TANNENBAUM, TEN KEYS TO LArIN AMEmCA 116 (1960).
Guatemala is, in effect, a non-national state. Dawson, Labor Legislation and Social
Integration in Guatemala: 1871-1944, 14 Am. J. Comp. L. 124, 127-28 (1965). The
same may be said of Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, which are clearly divided culturally
between majorities of a primarily aboriginal, non-European orientation, and minorities
who consider themselves part of the twentieth century western world. SOCIAL CHANCE
i LATIN AMERICA TODAY: ITS IMPUCATIONS FOR JNrIED STATES POLICY 68-176
(Council on Foreign Relations ed. 1960).
84. This accords with our own jurists' most recent thinking, as demonstrated by the
liberal admissibility requirements of the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rules 501-531
(1942).
85. Supra note 80. The Chilean CODICO DE PSOCEDIMIENTO CIVIL art. 357 (Edici6n
Official ed. 1964), excludes also "those who make a profession of testifying in court."
According to art. 480 of the Peruvian Code, a witness who does not speak Spanish may
be examined through an interpreter appointed by the judge. Article 491 provides
for expert testimony upon "points which demand special knowledge in some science
or art." Supra note 80, art. 480-91.
86. CODIco PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMMERCIAL DE LA NACION (Secretaria de Estado do
Justicia ed. 1967).
87. Supra note 80. These persons can, however, testify concerning age, civil status,
and family matters. See also art. 359 of the Chilean Code. The Chilean Code in
art. 365 also provides for oral examination by the judge. Supra note 85, art. 359 & 365.
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can, withinterrupts a witness's testimony may be fined.8 No party
89
out court permission, summon over twelve witnesses.
Of major concern to aliens are the very short periods of time which
many Latin American procedural codes provide for answering pleadings or for appealing adverse decisions. For example, the Peruvian
Code allows ten days after notification to answer complaints and
gives five days within which to appeal.9 0 Honduras allows three days
within which to appeal from final judgment, 91 while the Argentine
and Chilean Codes each allow five days.9 2 These periods seem rather
brief when litigation involving litigants thousands of miles apart is
today such a real possibility. Other provisions, however, may indicate that these periods only become operative once a party has received notification in the form of a complaint or notice of final judgment.93 Thus, the time period might not start to run until a defendant
in, for example, the United States, had been served with appropriate
papers by the consul of the foreign nation involved. Moreover, the
Argentine Code, which ordinarily allows fifteen days to answer complaints, also provides extensions based upon one day for every two
hundred kilometers between a defendant and the court where litigation has begun.9 4 The Chilean Code grants defendants located abroad
eighteen days to answer, plus a number of days equivalent to the time
in which a defendant would have to answer a complaint in his own
jurisdiction. 95
These curtailed periods are not inexplicable. Very often procedural
codes were adopted a number of years ago, before international litigation became the distinct possibility it is today, so that their drafters
contemplated only parties in the same city or town, if not country.
Or, as with the new Argentine Code, drafters felt that short time
periods would accelerate court procedures and relieve court congestion. 6
This raises the problem of judicial efficiency. One of the most
frequently-heard complaints among alien businessmen operating in
Latin America is that while court procedures are generally fair, an
inordinately long time elapses before decisions are rendered. There
is, of course, no doubt that justice delayed is justice denied, and
88. Supra note 86.
89. Supra note 86, art. 430.
90. Supra note 86, arts. 320 & 1093.
91. CODIGO DE PRocmmmENo

Y ENJUCrAMiENTO CIVIL DE HorNurAs

203 (1949 ed.).
92. Supra note 86, art. 244; supra note 85, art. 189.
93. Supra note 80, art. 1093.
94. Supra note 86, arts. 158, 335, 338.
95. Supra note 85, art. 259.
96. Personal interviews in Buenos Aires during February, 1967.

1906, art.
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dilatory administration of justice has on more than one occasion inspired complaints of denial of justice.9 7 However, before casting the
first stone, one might consider that in New York there has been no
addition to the Manhattan and the Bronx Supreme Courts in fortythree years. Calendars are incredibly clogged. In the supreme court
there is a present delay of over six months in tort jury cases in some
fifteen counties, ranging as high as fifty-four months in Suffolk County and fifty months in Duchess and Rockland. Pending cases now
total over 67,500 for the New York Supreme Court, and 140,000 for
New York City's civil court.98
Latin American court congestion difficulties are intimately related
not only to the increased complexities and congestion of urban life
which beset courts in the United States, but also to waves of internal
immigration as country dwellers flock to the cities to escape the hopeless poverty of rural life. They eke out existence in hovels built from
packing cases, cardboard, mud bricks and scrap lumber in the favelas
in Rio de Janeiro, the barriadasof Lima, and the villas de miseria in
Buenos Aires. They cling to the hills surrounding Bogota' and Caracas, often burrowing caves in the ground for shelter. Their presence has created grave political, social and health dilemmas, as well
as problems of bitter social maladjustment, crime and law enforcement.99 The situation does not appear to be improving, since galloping birth rates quickly cancel any gains in new housing erected by
well-intentioned governments.
B. Civil Rights and Their Enforcement
Latin American constitutions promise citizens and aliens certain
minimum civil rights. The Peruvian Constitution provides that no
97. RE TATEmE,
supra note 61, § 181(h), includes among factors to be considered
in determining if an alien has had a fair trial, whether he has had the benefit of
"reasonable dispatch by the tribunal or administrative authority in reaching a determination." Courts in Brazil and Mexico, for example, are so congested that they cannot
pass promptly upon applications for mandados da seguranza and amparo, which were
designed to assure swift relief from governmental violations of basic civil rights. Eder,
supra note 69, at 584, 602. A member of the Brazilian Bar writes "given the general
lack of expeditious handling of civil cases by the judicial system plus the relative
unavailability of emergency remedies, plus traditionally low awards, it is desirable to
conduct one's affairs in such a manner that if it is necessary to resort to court, the
most rapid and best protected remedy is available. Generally speaking, this would
invoke an executory or summary proceeding, which in turn generally presupposes an
obligation which is 'liquid and certain,' such as a negotiable instrument or a secured
credit (by mortgage, pledge, etc.), which normally does not include a suit upon a
contract." GAn.,AND, supra note 82, at 23.
98. Fuld, The Gordian Knot: Congestion and Delay in Our Courts, 39 N.Y.S.B.A.J.
488, 489 (1967).
99. W. BENToN, THE VoiCE oF LAarIN AmEnxcA 17-18 (1961); TANNENBAUM, supra
note 83, at 206-07.
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one may be detained without written warrant except in cases of
fraglante delicto, and, in any event, the detained person must be
arraigned within twenty-four hburs. 1'0 The Constitution also guarantees rights of peaceful assembly, freedom of the press, rights of petition, and the inviolability of the home against unauthorized entry. 01'
Article 23 extends these rights to resident aliens. 0 2 In Brazil article
150 assures resident aliens and nationals of: (1) freedom of speech,
press, peaceful assembly; (2) freedom from ex post facto legislation;
(3) the right to jury trial in homicide cases, to a full defense at law,
to due process of law, to habeas corpus; and (4) the right to sue
the government for its acts. 03 Article 20 of the Argentine Constitution grants foreigners, whether or not they are residents, all the
civil rights of citizens. 1 4 The Ecuadorean Constitution in article 180
states: "In Ecuador foreigners enjoy, within the limits of the law, the
same rights as Ecuadorians, with the exception of political rights and
the guarantees which the Constitution establishes in favor.ho Ecuadorians only." 05
To protect these rights from abuse by the state, Latin Americans
have devised several procedural safeguards, the efficacy of which may
be inversely proportional to the strength of the regime in power, and,
very often, related to the wealth, education and influence of the person invoking them. These devices include habeas corpus, the Brazilian
mandclo de seguranza, the Mexican amparo, and the Colombian
popular action.
The existence of these safeguards stems from the ability of indtviduals, be they aliens or natiQnals,- tosue the state. In Latin America
the state is generally considered a juridical person with rights and
obligations at private law, and can therefore be summoned to account
for its actions in open court. 0 6 The common law theory that the

sovereign can do no wrong is not well known, despite Latin Ameri100. CONSTITuTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PERu

ed. 1965).

1933, art. 56 (Pan American Union

101. Id. arts. 57-66.
102. Id. art. 23.

103.
104.

CoNsTITUTION OF BAzrL 1967 (Pan American Union ed. 1967).
CONSTTOON OF THE REPUBmIC OF ARGENTnxA 1853 (Pan American Union

ed. 1963).
105. Supra note 77.
106. 3 M. WE

MAN,

DIGEST

OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

411-13 (1967),

citing,

Sullivan, The Alien's Right to Bring Suit Against the State: A Preliminary Survey,
memorandum, May 1, 1961, MS. DEPT. OF STATE, file 711, 332/5-161. There are
exceptions. The 1952 Guatemalan Ley de Reforma Agraria indicated there could be
no judicial review of expropriations made pursuant to it. Recourse could be had to
executive agencies, but the times for appeal were so short that it was theoretically possible "to expropriate a property fully and totally within six weeks." Stem, Guatemalan
Agrarian Reform Law, 2 Am. J.Coup. L. 235, 237 (1953).
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can proclivities for strong central government. Thus, in Colombia

the Consejo de Estado, the nation's supreme administrative court, has
exclusive jurisdiction over claims for compensation arising from ex-

propriations by the state. 107 Even when in 1963 the administration

of Argentina's President Ilia cancelled petroleum concession contracts
executed by the predecessor Frondizi government, the oil companies,
most of which were foreign, were able to obtain court orders restraining Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales, the government oil monopoly,
from seizing the fields in question.'m
Of all Anglo-American institutions, habeas corpus has been most

admired and imitated by our neighbors to the south. Brazil was the
first Latin American nation to adopt habeas corpus, and in the Penal

Code of 1830 made it a criminal offense for judges to refuse or delay
issuance of the writ, which in 1871 was specifically made available

to aliens.'0 9 While at first the writ was designed to prevent restraints
upon movement, it was eventually extended by courts to threats to
personal liberty even where no detention had yet occurred. Thus, the
first Brazilian republican constitution in 1891 provided: "Habeas
corpus is given whenever an individual suffers or is in imminent danger

of suffering violence or coercion by reason of illegality or abuse of
power.""" Since illegality was considered to include unconstitutional-

ity, the writ was extended to obtain judicial review of legislative and
executive acts. However, a 1926 constitutional amendment limited the

writ to its original purpose-protection against unjustifiable restrictions
on freedom of movement."'
107. H. CLAG=I'r, THE ADMiNiSTRATION OF JusTICE IN LATIN AmEyICA 61-63 (1952);
personal interviews in Bogota, Colombia, August, 1965.
108. For analysis of the background of the cancellation, see Luce, Argentina and
the Hickenlooper Amendment, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 2078 (1966). A January 13, 1066,
decision by the Peruvian Supreme Court should be noted. Until recently the sale of
matches in Peru was a government monopoly. The government imported matches from
the Swedish Match Company, reselling them in boxes under a very colorful trademark
depicting a Peruvian Llama, which had been registered in Peru in the name of the
Swedish Match Company since 1924. In 1954 the monopoly was abolished. In
1963 a private firm in Lima entered into an agreement with the Swedish Match
Company to import matches and sell them under the Llama trademark. Legislators
in congress then alleged that the Swedish company was using the trademark improperly,
since it had become state property due to its use by the government monopoly for over
forty years. On September 30, 1964, the executive branch ordered the mark re-registered as state property. The Swedish company sued, receiving a favorable decision
in First Instance, losing in the Second Instance, and then, winning a final victory in the
Supreme Court. The Court ordered the government to re-register the trademark
in the plaintiff's name. BOLEIN INFORMATIVO DEL MINSTRO DE RELACIONES
ExramIoRs No. 1443, Lima, February 15, 1966.
109. Eder, Habeas Corpus Disembodied: The Latin American Experience, in
TwENTrr
CENTURy COmPAPATW- AND CoNFLIcTs LAW 463, 466-67 (1961).
110. Id. at 467.
111. Eder, Judicial Review in Latin America, 21 OmO ST. L.J. 570, 581 (1960).
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Despite the current Brazilian military regime, habeas corpus is still
obtainable by aliens and citizens alike under article 150(20) of the
1967 constitution, and has been used effectively to minimize dangers
to personal liberty represented by recent expansion of the military
tribunals' jurisdiction over civilians. 1 2
Brazilians and aliens may also rely upon the "writ of security," or
Mandado de Seguranza, as a procedural remedy similar to our injunction 1 3 to enjoin government officials from acting in clear viola-

tion of the laws or of the Constitution." 4 A commonly invoked pro-

cedure, 11 its great value lies in preventing government action before
it occurs, thus avoiding the subsequent necessity of recourse to administrative or judicial claim procedures to recover damages based
upon the illegal action. The writ must be filed in the Supreme Court
when it is against the President of the Republic, and in the Federal
Court of Appeals when cabinet ministers are its target." 6 Since it is
7
considered a "summary action," it is adjudicated expeditiously."
In Mexico, the amparo remedy was developed to test the unconstitutionality of legislation and to enjoin government action by extending the habeas corpus concept to all constitutional freedoms. How-

ever, it is available only in federal courts, since only they can declare
statutes unconstitutional." 8 The amparo complaint must describe the
act against which the action is brought, the constitutional provisions
deemed violated, and the manner in which violation occurred. The
defendant authority must then answer,, after which there is a court
112. Article 120(1) of the 1967 Brazilian Constitution extends the jurisdiction of
military courts to "civilians in cases provided'for by law, for the repression of crimes
against national security or the military institutions, with the right of ordinary military
appeal to the federal Supreme Court." Supra note 103, art. 120(1). Although practically all Latin American nations recognize the right to habeas corpus, efficiacy may
depend upon the attitude of the regime in power. In Argentina during the Peron era
judges who granted the writ were subject to reprisals. Eder, supra note 109, at
470.
113. "A writ of security shall be granted to protect a clear and certain right of an
individual not protected by habeas corpus, regardless of what authority may be
responsible for the illegality or abuse of power." Supra note 103, art. 150(21).
114. CLAGETr, supra note 107, at 141-42; Eder, supra note 109, at 582; Eder, supra
note 111, at 468-69.
115. H. DE VnMs & J. RoDnGuEz-NovAs, in THE LAw OF THE A MEIcAs 196 (1965)
state that in the Federal District, between 1950 and 1958, approximately 22,000 madados
were filed, as against a total of 9,942 actions of other types brought against the
government.
116. CLAGET, supra note 107, at 142; Eder, supra note 111, at 583.
117. But see Eder, supranote 111, at 584.
118. CONSTrruTmON Or f= UNrrED MExcA STATEs 1917, art. 107, as amended
(Pan American Union ed. 1964). See general discussion in CLAGETT, supra note 107,
at 135-39; Eder, supra note 111, at 599-602. The amparo concept -has been adopted
in several other Latin American states, including Guatemala. CoNsTrrtMON OF THE
REPUBLC OF GUATEmALA 1965, arts. 80-84 (Pan American Union ed. 1966).
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hearing in which evidence is offered. The action can only be directed
against an act of a public authority, be it legislative, administrative,
or judicial. Proof is required of direct personal injury, although this
need not be financial." 9
There are limitations on amparo, since in general it cannot
enjoin expropriations for the public benefit. Thus, Mexican courts
held that amparo did not lie against decrees expropriating foreign oil
properties because the community interest was involved. 120 Furthermore, as already noted, 121 decisions of unconstitutionality apply only
to the case at bar, and precedent binding on lower courts is created
only when the supreme court renders five identical amparo decisions
on the same constitutional point. 122
The Colombian Constitution, article 214, enables private citizens
to challenge the constitutionality of laws and decrees before the Supreme Court. 23 This, the so-called popular action, resembles our declaratory action except that there need be no actual controversy.
Moreover, it "permits challenge of statutes dealing with purely administrative matters not likely to become the subject of private litigation and thus integrates the duty of the Supreme Court to act as
guardian of the whole Constitution and not merely of the Bill of
Rights." 2 4 It has been utilized to hold confiscation of enemy alien
property unconstitutional12 and to invalidate legislation expropriating
private property for public use without compensation, interfering with
freedom of speech, and granting special privileges running counter to
the principle of equality before the law. 26
However, the effectiveness of the relief promised by habeas corpus,
the mandado de seguranza, amparo, and the popular action may be
severely diluted by another Latin American institution, the suspensi6n
de garantfas or estado de sitio, by which, in times of national emergency, the exercise of basic civil rights may be temporarily forbidden.
At such times either the issuance of the protective writ itself may
119. Eder, supra note 111, at 600.
120. Ramirez, Orantes, Burgoa, Clagett, The Mexican Suit of Amparo, 33 GE.

L.J.

418 (1945).
121. Supra note 76.
122. NutvA LEY DE AMiAno, arts. 192 & 193, Dauuo Omcm&L, January 10, 1936;
as amended DiAmUo OmcL
April 30, 1968.
123. CoNsrn-sroN OF = REPumic OF CoLommrA 1886 (Pan American Union ed.

1962).
124. Eder, supra note 111, at 592.
125. Eder, Confiscation of Enemy Alien PropertyHeld UnconstitutionalBy Colombian
Supreme Court, 54 Am. J. Iser', L. 159 (1960).
126. Grant, Judicial Control of the Constitutionality of Statutes and Administratioe
Legislation in'Columbia: Nature and Evolution of the Present System, 23 S.CAL. L.
Ruv. 484 (1950).
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be suspended or, as is more likely, enjoyment of rights which the
writ is designed to enforce may -be denied.
Thus, article 69 of the Peruvian Constitution, which states that "all
the individual and social rights recognized by the Constitution admit
of the action of habeas corpus," extends habeas corpus beyond physical detention to assure freedom from arrest without a warrant, the
right of public assembly, and the inviolability of the home and correspondence from unauthorized search and seizure. 127 Article 70 of
the Constitution states, however, that "when necessary for the security
of the State," the executive branch may totally or partially suspend
the aforesaid guarantees, eliminating, in effect, these particular rights
for which habeas corpus could otherwise be invoked.'1 In Argentina
the same situation may be produced by declaration of a state of siege
"in the event of internal disorder" either by Congress or by the President when Congress is not in session.'2 9 Article 151 of the Guatemalan Constitution grants the President the power, in the event of
invasion, "serious disturbance of the peace, public disaster, or of activities against the security of the State," to suspend guarantees relating
to arrest without warrant, freedom of speech, freedom from unwarranted search and seizure, and the right of peaceful assembly, 130 all
of which would ordinarily be protected by habeas corpus and amparo.
Article 107 of the Honduran Constitution authorizes the President to
suspend the above guarantees and, in addition, to suspend the right
of habeas corpus itself.'3 '
The foregoing suspensions apply to nationals and aliens alike. In
some circumstances they may even be directed especially to aliens,
although not all constitutions are as clear as that of Colombia, which
states in article 11: "foreigners shall enjoy in Colombia the same civil
rights that are accorded Colombians. But the law may, for reasons of
public order, subject foreigners to special conditions or deny them
the exercise of specified civil rights."'3
Occasionally special domestic legislation, such as the 1967 Argentine
Repression of Communism Act,'3 may pose special difficulties in the
civil rights area. This legislation, drafted by the Government of Gen127. The guarantee is supplemented by art. 133, whereby a petition against the
state may be brought in the courts in respect of any regulation, decision or government
decree of general application which may be in violation of the constitution or of the
law. Supra note 100, arts. 69 & 133.
128. Supra note 100, art. 70.
129. Supra note 104, arts. 67(26) & 86(19).
130. CoNsrrrrboN oF GuATEmA
, supranote 118, art. 151.
131. CONs'rrtrIoN OF THE REPUBrIC OF HoN DUAS 1965, art. 107 (Pan American
Union ed. 1966).
132. Supra note 123, art. 11.
133. REPRmioN DEL ComusNISo Ley No. 17,401, BOLETIN OFiCrAL 29/VII/67.
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eral Carlos Ongania, provides imprisonment of one to eight years
and, in the case of aliens or naturalized citizens, expulsion from the
country, for persons classified as "Communists." 1' Article 1 defines
Communists as "physical or legal persons who carry on activities
proven to be of undoubtedly Communist ideological motivation.
Activities carried on prior to this law may be taken into account."'35
An administrative agency determines in secret proceedings, if
persons are Communists, and then notifies the person involved of its
decision. The determination may then be appealed through adminis.trative channels to the executive power.1 Once administrative remedies are exhausted, an aggrieved party may appeal to a federal court,
which will only reverse the administrative decision if it indicates
"manifest arbitrariness." 13 7
Natural persons classified as Communists may not, inter alia, become citizens, hold public office, teach in public or private schools,
receive state scholarships, operate radio or television stations, acquire,
direct or administer publication activities, or hold offices in labor
unions. 38 Companies which are being investigated under the Act
may be "intervened" by the government and their activities sus39 Aliens "who, because of their backgrounds, are reputed to
pended.1
be Communists" may be denied entry into the country. 40 Persons
classified as Communists under the Act may, at the end of five years,
petition for their "rehabilitation," offering evidence that during this
period they have not engaged in subversive activities.' 41
The preamble to the Act states that there is no intent to penalize
the rights of citizens to freedom of expression concerning "political
and social events," and that it is only directed against Communist
inspired "activities disturbing to or subversive of the social order."14 2
Nevertheless, the legislative standards seem quite vague and susceptible to varying interpretations.
134. Ley No. 17,401, arts. 11, 14 & 15; Decreto 8329 of November 13, 1967,
establishes in greater detail the procedures to be followed in classification, 14 REvvsTA
-DE LEGisLAcIoN ARmaENTA, JTmJRuISPDENCA ARGENTIA 69 (Nov., 1967).
135. Ley No. 17,401, art. 1.
136. Id. at arts. 3 & 4.
137. Id. at art. 4.
138. Id. at art. 6.
139. Id. at art. 9.
140. Id. at art. 7. This prohibition does'not apply to members of the diplomatic or
consular corps or to members of official government missions.
141. Id. at art. 10.
142. BOL=TIN INFoRmATIVo: ANALEs DE LEGISLACiON ARGENTINA No. 26 at 7
(Sept. 11, 1967).
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V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing is a highly selective resum6 of treatment accorded
aliens under procedural legislation in various Latin American nations.
A more comprehensive survey would include consideration of the
influence of aboriginal law upon current legal attitudes, the implications of code systems with respect to legal reasoning, the arbitration
of private disputes which transcend national frontiers, the availability
of legal aid, the enforcement of foreign judgments, and the treatment
accorded enemy aliens.
In general, however, it appears that aliens receive equitable treatment in Latin American courts, especially in commercial matters, although to a certain extent this may vary with the political environment and the nationality of the particular alien. An alien which is a
citizen of a state with which the host nation wishes to maintain good
relations may receive better treatment in the administration of the
law than citizens of nations with143which the host state has boundary
disputes or other disagreements.

Jurisprudential and political considerations aside, the personal adjustment of the alien to the local environment may also seriously affect
the consideration which his claim receives from both national courts
and from his own diplomatic representatives. Willingness to cooperate
with municipal authorities, to observe the substantive laws of the host
state even when nationals may not do so, and to abide by local court
and administrative procedures and customs is not only the first line
of defense before national tribunals, but also builds a record of good
faith which the alien may eventually find indispensible in persuading
his own state to espouse his claim.
143. This is equally true in substantive areas of the law. One commentator suggests
that although both English and United States oil properties were nationalized by
Mexico, English companies received "a proportionately greater recompense than
did their American counterparts" because historically the United States had long been
regarded by Mexicans as aggressive and imperialistic. CLnq', Ti UNrTE STATES
AND MExico 250 (1940).

